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1 Introduction
The tax incidence literature is unconcerned about tax competition issues. Indeed, tradi-
tional tax incidence models usually consider tax rates to be exogenously determined and
focus on the pass-through of taxes to consumer prices without taking the tax setting-
process into account.1 On the other hand, several strands of literature such as optimal
taxation and tax competition do focus on the tax setting decision but do not consider tax
incidence. Standard tax competition models, for example, consider the strategic tax set-
ting by diﬀerent levels of government (or diﬀerent jurisdictions belonging to the same tier
of government) sharing the tax base but implicitly assume that the incidence of taxes is
fully on consumers by assuming producer prices to be constant.2 Therefore, the potential
under-/overreaction of prices to a variation in tax rates is ruled out.
Interestingly though, both strands of literature do have some common features. The
functional form of demand, for instance, plays a key role in both frameworks. In a
tax incidence setting, a linear demand function implies undershifting and an iso-elastic
demand function results in overshifting of taxes.3 Similarly, in a vertical tax competition
framework, the sign of the reaction function is determined by the curvature of demand.
Keen (1997) is among the ﬁrst to show the importance of the functional form of demand
to determine the sign of the vertical reaction function. As it is standard in theoretical
tax competition studies, the interpretation of the results goes through the analysis of two
special cases: linear and iso-elastic demand functions. Whilst the former implies that taxes
are strategic substitutes (i.e., the vertical reaction function is negative), the latter suggests
strategic complementarity (i.e., the vertical reaction function is positive). Devereux et al.
(2007) extend Keen's setting by allowing for horizontal competition (introduced by cross-
border shopping). The authors show that, in the symmetric case, the horizontal reaction
function between two states (i and j) is always positive i.e., ( dti
dtj
=
dtj
dti
> 0). Moreover,
even in the presence of individual's preferences heterogeneity, suﬃcient conditions for
this result to hold are not too strong. More recently, Agrawal (2015) goes one step
forward by introducing multiple competing federal governments and, thus, by allowing
for diagonal externalities i.e., ﬁscal externalities between neighboring jurisdictions that
are of a diﬀerent level of government. The author ﬁnds that diagonal interactions have
the same sign as horizontal ones, but are smaller in magnitude.4 All these papers assume
1Krzyzaniak and Musgrave (1963) were among the ﬁrst to suggest that, in oligopolistic and monopo-
listic markets, taxes could be overshifted to ﬁnal prices. Katz and Rosen (1985), Seade (1985) and Besley
(1989) are among the main theoretical references having taken up their point. For a detailed review on
tax incidence literature, see Fullerton and Metcalf (2002).
2See, for instance, Keen (1997) and Devereux et al. (2007).
3For the sake of correctness, two parameters deﬁne the under/overshifting condition in tax incidence
models: the functional form of demand and cost functions. Though, as described by Seade (1985)
and Besley (1989), under fairly standard assumptions and without too much loss of generality, the tax
incidence condition is uniquely determined by the curvature of the demand function.
4Other papers explore diﬀerent aspects of tax competition. Esteller-Moré et al. (2012), for instance,
consider a similar setting to the one is this paper i.e., a federation with two layers of government, in which
Leviathan policy makers levy excise taxes on a consumption good and that is produced in an imperfectly
competitive market. Nevertheless, their focus is on the negative externality produced by the good and,
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producer prices to be constant. Hence, the pass-through of taxes is restricted to be
fully on consumers and, therefore, the possibility of an overreaction of prices to taxes is
ruled out by construction. This is particularly striking because excise taxes are usually
levied in oligopolistic, highly-concentrated markets such as those for cigarettes, gasoline
or alcohol beverages. As it is well known from tax incidence literature, under imperfectly
competitive markets prices can react more (less) than proportionally to a variation in tax
rates i.e., taxes can be overshifted (undershifted). In other words, by assuming producer
prices to be constant, previous tax competition models constraint taxes to be fully shifted
to consumers and, thus, rule out any potential impact coming from tax incidence features.
To sum up, this paper extends the simplest model of tax competition in excise taxes
that was set in Keen (1997), where only vertical interactions are considered, by relaxing
the assumption that producer prices are constant and, therefore, by explicitly introducing
the tax incidence features that were ruled out. By allowing prices to under/overreact to
a variation in tax rates, market structure turns out to have a key role in determining the
vertical reaction function. The sign of the reaction function (and, thus, the complemen-
tarity/substitutability condition) is not modiﬁed but, interestingly, the number of ﬁrms in
the industry has now an impact on the sensitivity of the vertical reaction. In other words,
the level of market concentration determines how reactive local taxes are to a variation
in higher-tier tax rates.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In next section the model is set up and
solved backwards. Section 3 derives the vertical reaction function in both settings. First,
dt
dT
is derived by constraining taxes to be fully-shifted to prices as in Keen (1997) and,
afterwards, without imposing any restriction on the shifting of taxes. Finally, Section 4
provides some concluding remarks.
2 The model
2.1 Setting
This model extends a vertical tax competition model à la Keen (1997) by adding a tra-
ditional Cournot setting as the one developed in Tirole (1988) as the second stage of the
game. Moreover, given the scope of the paper, an excise tax (τ = t + T ) is added to the
proﬁt function of the ﬁrm. While t is the excise tax rate applied by the local government,
T is the one applied by the higher-tier or federal government. Firms react in the same
way no matter the level of government levying the tax.5
The goal of the model is to endogenize the (local) tax setting decision by assuming that
particularly, on the inﬂuence that special interest groups may have on tax policy by lobbying the policy
makers. The authors ﬁnd that depending on market structure and on the level of the externality, lobbying
can improve eﬃciency, and that tax-base sharing by the two levels of government can also be more eﬃcient
than taxation by a single layer.
5A few empirical papers such as Chouinard and Perloﬀ (2007) and Marion and Muehlegger (2011)
assess the diﬀerences in the pass-through depending on the level of government levying the tax. Nev-
ertheless, this remains an empirical issue and, as it is standard in theoretical tax incidence models this
distinction is not taken into account in this model.
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lower-tier policy makers anticipate the reaction of ﬁrms to τ and adjust their decisions
in consequence. In other words, local governments take ﬁrm's under/overshifting of taxes
into account when setting the tax rates t.
There are three diﬀerent agents in the economy: policy makers (federal and lower-tier
governments), producers and consumers.6 The federal government sets a tax rate T that
is assumed exogenous for the rest of the agents. Then, in the ﬁrst stage of the game, local
governments in each state j = 1, ..., S play Nash with respect to the federal government
and react to T by setting tj in order to maximize revenue Rj = tjXj, where Xj is the tax
base. There are i = 1, ..., N proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms competing à la Cournot by choosing
their level of output qi so that
∑N
i=1 qi = Q. Finally, following Keen (1997), I characterize
consumers' preferences by the indirect utility function ν(P ) + Γ(g,G), where νi(·) and
Γi(·) are strictly concave; g and G are the quantities of local and federal public goods,
respectively and P is the consumer price of the taxed good. I assume additivity in (·) in
order to assure that the demand for the taxed good, x(P ) = −ν ′(P ) (by Roy's identity),
is independent of public expenditure.
The model is set as a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, the tax policy t is determined.
In the latter one, ﬁrms maximize proﬁts given the tax rates set in the previous stage and
the equilibrium is determined. The model is solved backwards.
2.2 Backwards solution
2.2.1 Second stage
Firms play a Cournot-Nash game in which they compete by choosing their level of output
qi conditional on the expectations of their competitors' output levels. Let ﬁrm i's proﬁt
function be:
pii = P (qi +Q−i)qi − c(qi)− τqi, (1)
where qi is the level of output of ﬁrm i, Q−i is the output of all other ﬁrms in the industry
and P (Q) is the inverse demand function for market demand Q. Finally, c(·) is the
cost function that is assumed identical for each ﬁrm. Indeed, since the model focuses on
symmetric equilibria, ﬁrms are assumed to be symmetric. Thus,
Nq = Q. (2)
Hence, subscripts are dropped and Equation (1) is re-expressed as follows:
pi = P (Nq)q − c(q)− τq. (1.1)
6The lower tier of government will be called local or state government throughout the paper.
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The ﬁrst- and second-order conditions for a given ﬁrm are as follows:7
dpi
dq
=
dP
dq
q + P − dc
dq
− τ = 0 (3)
d2pi
dq2
=
d2P
dq2
q + 2
dP
dq
− d
2c
dq2
< 0. (4)
Finally, solving Equation (3) for q, one gets the following equilibrium expression for the
ﬁrms' output:
qˆ =
dc
dq
+ τ − P
dP
dq
. (5)
2.2.2 First stage
As it was mentioned above, local tax rates are set in the ﬁrst stage of the game. As the
focus of the paper is on vertical interactions, states are assumed to be symmetric (tj = t);
each consisting of a single representative consumer. In addition, the tax base is assumed
to be completely immobile across states. These two assumptions considerably simplify
the model. First, by ruling out horizontal competition. Second, by imposing a single
consumer one can deﬁne the tax base for each state equal to the individual demand of the
single consumer living in that jurisdiction i.e., X = x(P ). Indeed, using the equilibrium
condition (X = Q), one can deﬁne the tax base in each state as X = x(P ) = Q.
Local governments are Leviathans and, thus, aim at maximizing revenue R = tX = tQ
by setting t. Therefore, the ﬁrst- and second-order conditions of the revenue maximizing
problem are the following ones:8
dR
dt
= Q+ t
dQ
dt
= 0 (6)
d2R
dt2
= 2
dQ
dt
+ t
d2Q
dt2
< 0. (7)
Now, solving Equation (6) for t by using the chain rule (i.e., dQ
dt
= dQ
dP
dP
dt
), one obtains the
following expression for the equilibrium tax rate:
tˆ = − Q
dQ
dP
dP
dt
. (8)
7Note that tax incidence models usually use a slightly diﬀerent notation than the one used in this
stage of the game. For example, in Equation (3) most of these studies would have used pi′ to indicate
"the derivative of the proﬁt function with respect to q" rather than dpidq . The reason to use a diﬀerent
notation is simply that this is the one used in tax competition settings and, thus, in the ﬁrst stage of this
model. In other words, given that tax incidence and tax competition models use diﬀerent notations, I
decided to stick to the one used in tax competition settings by adjusting the notation used in this stage
of the game.
8The second-order condition is assumed to hold.
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Finally, Equation (8) can be re-expressed in ad-valorem terms as follows:
tˆ
P
= − 1
dQ
dP
P
Q
dP
dt
=
1
dP
dt
, (9)
where  = −dQ
dP
P
Q
> 0 is the elasticity of the aggregate demand function.
Traditional vertical competition models assume producer prices to be constant (some-
times they are even normalized to zero). Therefore, consumer prices are given by P = τ =
t + T and, therefore dP
dτ
= dP
dt
= 1. Hence, as expected, by assuming dP
dτ
= 1 (and, thus,
dP
dt
= 1), one is back to the standard formula present in previous tax competition settings
indicating that the optimal tax rate (in ad-valorem terms) is inversely proportional to the
elasticity of the tax base.9
By relaxing this assumption, this model explicitly allows policy makers to internalize
tax incidence features when setting their tax rates. In other words, local governments
recognize that taxes are not necessarily fully-passed to consumer prices but can also be
under/overshifted and take this into consideration when setting t.
Next section shows how the vertical competition reaction function is modiﬁed once
there is no constraint on dP
dτ
. The main outcome of the model (i.e., the comparabil-
ity/substitutability condition) is not modiﬁed but, interestingly, market structure turns
out to play a crucial role in determining the sensitivity of local tax rates (t) to a variation
in T .
3 The vertical reaction function
One of the key features of the ﬁrst stage of the game is given by the two tiers of government
taxing the same good and, thus, sharing the tax base. From a tax competition perspective,
the focus is on the strategic interactions arising because of this. In other words, one would
like to assess how a variation in T aﬀects the state's choice of t.
3.1 The vertical reaction function when dPdτ = 1 is imposed
As shown in Section 2 previous tax competition models obtain the standard expression
that the tax rate (in ad-valorem terms) is inversely proportional to the elasticity of demand
i.e., Equation (9) is simpliﬁed as follows:
tˆ
P
=
1

. (9.1)
Now, the goal of this paper is to assess the vertical reaction function i.e., the reaction
of state governments to a variation in the federal tax rate. To say it diﬀerently, one would
like to know how the equality in Equation (9.1) will be aﬀected by a variation in T and,
particularly, how t will adjust in order to restore it.
9See, for example, Keen (1997) and Devereux et al. (2007).
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Unfortunately, it is impossible to solve tax competition models (i.e., to sign dt
dT
) for the
general case. Nevertheless, one can illustrate the main outcome of these models through
the two most studied cases in the literature: iso-elastic and linear demand functions.
When demand is of the iso-elastic type (¯), an increase in T will rise the consumer
price P and, thus, reduce the left hand side of Equation (9.1). Given that the elasticity
of demand is constant, t has to increase in order to restore the equality in Equation (9.1).
Thus, dt
dT
> 0 and taxes are strategic complements.
If demand is of the linear type, Equation (9.1) can be re-expressed as follows:
tˆ =
1
−
(
Q′
Q
) . (9.2)
An increase in T will rise the consumer price P and, thus, Q will decrease. Given that
the elasticity of demand is linear, the slope of the demand curve is constant (Q¯′) and,
therefore, the equality in Equation (9.2) can only be restored by decreasing t. Thus, in
the linear demand/cost case, dt
dT
< 0 and taxes are strategic substitutes.
In other words, one can summarize the main outcome of previous vertical tax compe-
tition studies by the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The vertical reaction function dt
dT
depends on the functional form of the
demand function. First, if x(P ) = x¯ so that individual demand is inelastic, then in
the neighborhood of Nash equilibrium, dt
dT
= 0. Second, in the symmetric case, once the
individual demand function is allowed to be elastic, the sign of the reaction function is
undeﬁned for the general case. Indeed, the sign of dt
dT
depends on the elasticity of the
demand function and, interestingly, the two most analyzed cases in the literature have the
following implications:
 If demand is iso-elastic, dt
dT
> 0 (t and T are strategic complements)
 If demand is linear, dt
dT
< 0 (t and T are strategic substitutes)
3.1.1 Correspondence between dP
dτ
and dt
dT
.
Before showing how the tax competition setting is aﬀected by allowing dP
dτ
6= 1, it is
worth highlighting the following feature shared by both tax incidence and tax competition
models: the functional form of demand is the key parameter determining the main output
in both settings.
Proposition 1 clearly shows how, from a tax competition perspective, the strategic
complementarity/substitutability condition depends on the curvature of the demand func-
tion. A similar result is obtained by recalling the following condition, that was derived
and sicussed in previous tax incidence studies such as Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) or
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Jametti et al. (2013):10
dP
dτ
=
N
N + (η + k)

< 1 ⇒ undershifting
= 1 ⇒ full shifting,
> 1 ⇒ overshifting
(10)
where η = Q
(
d2P
dq2
dP
dq
)
is the elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand function and
k = 1−
(
d2c
dq2
dP
dq
)
measures the relative slopes of the demand and marginal cost curves.
Equation (10) is a well known result in tax incidence literature and has some implica-
tions that will be useful for the rest of the paper. First, market structure (N) does not
determine tax incidence condition, in equilibrium. Note that, counter-intuitively, even
highly concentrated markets may undershift taxes under non-cooperative proﬁt maxi-
mization if (η + k) < 0. Second, market structure does, nevertheless, determine the
degree of the tax shifting. Independently of whether taxes are under or overshifted, the
absolute value of dP
dτ
is always the furthest away from one (full shifting) when N = 1, and
approaches full shifting as N tends to inﬁnity (perfect competition).
Moreover, note that if costs are linear (d
2P
dq2
= 0 and, thus, k = 1), a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for taxes to be overshifted is that η < −1. If demand is of the
constant elasticity type, this is always the case because a demand elasticity  > 0 implies
that η = −1+

< −1 for all . In fact, in this case, Equation (10) can be re-expressed as
follows:
dP
dτ
=
N
N − 1+

+ 1
> 1. (11)
Thus, in the linear cost/iso-elastic demand case there is always overshifting.
Similarly, with linear costs and a linear demand function (η = 0), Equation (10) is
simpliﬁed as follows:
dP
dτ
=
N
N + 1
< 1. (12)
Thus, in the linear cost/linear demand case, taxes are always undershifted.
To sum up, there exists a correspondence between the outputs of tax incidence and
tax competition models that is illustrated in Table 1 and formalized by the following
conjecture:
Conjecture 1 In the symmetric case, at symmetric Nash equilibrium, the following cor-
respondence between the pass through of taxes to consumer prices and the vertical reaction
function arises:

dP
dτ
< 1⇔ dt
dT
< 0

dP
dτ
> 1⇔ dt
dT
> 0
10Equation (10) can be derived from the ﬁrst stage of the model. The formal derivation is shown in
the Appendix.
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Despite this correspondence, these two strands of literature have not been studied in
a comprehensive setting. Hence, the formalization of this result is a ﬁrst contribution of
this model to the public ﬁnance literature.
3.2 The vertical reaction function when no constraint on dPdτ is
imposed
As one can observe from Equation (10), the dP
dτ
= 1 condition is veriﬁed if and only if
η+k = 0 or under perfect competition (N →∞). Assuming either of these two conditions
to hold is quite a strong statement that deserves, at least, some comments. First, note
that η + k = 0 is far from being the general rule or even from representing the most
important cases in the literature. Indeed, under the two most analyzed scenarios given by
linear costs (k = 1) and, either linear (η = 0) or iso-elastic (η = −1+

) demand functions,
η + k 6= 0. Second, it would be even more striking to justify dP
dτ
= 1 by assuming perfect
competition. In particular, because most of these tax competition models focus on excise
taxes that are usually levied in highly concentrated industries such as gasoline, cigarette
or alcohol beverages markets. In other words, assuming constant producer prices and,
thus, imposing dP
dτ
= 1 considerably simpliﬁes the model. Nevertheless, this seem to be a
strong and hardly justiﬁable assumption.
Now, the crucial question is how the vertical reaction function is modiﬁed when no
constraint on dP
dτ
is imposed.
Plugging the tax incidence condition for the iso-elastic case given by Equation (11) in
Equation (9), I obtain:
tˆ
P
=
1

(
1− 1
N
)
. (9.3)
An increase in T will rise the consumer price P and, thus, reduce the left hand side
of Equation (9.3). Given that the elasticity of demand is constant (¯), the only way
to restore the equality (in the ﬁxed-N case) is through an increase in t. Thus, in the
iso-elastic demand/linear cost case, dt
dT
> 0 and taxes are strategic complements.
Similarly, in the linear demand case the expression for the equilibrium tax rate is given
by Equation (9):
tˆ
P
=
1
dP
dt
. (9)
Once again, for the sake of simplicity, one can re-express Equation (9) as follows:
tˆ =
1
−
(
Q′
Q
)
dP
dt
. (9.4)
Plugging the tax incidence condition for the linear demand case given by Equation (12)
in Equation (9.4), one gets:
tˆ =
1
−
(
Q′
Q
)
N
N+1
. (9.5)
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An increase in T will rise the consumer price P and, thus, Q will decrease. Given that
the elasticity of demand is linear, the slope of the demand curve is constant (Q¯′) and,
therefore, the equality in Equation (9.5) can only be restored by decreasing t. Thus, in
the linear demand/cost case, dt
dT
< 0 and taxes are strategic substitutes.
3.3 Discussion of results
By comparing equations (9.3) and (9.5) to equations (9.1) and (9.2), respectively, one can
already identify the main diﬀerence between previous models and this setting. Whereas
the number of ﬁrms (N) was absent in previous tax competition models, it is now explicitly
introduced as a determinant of the vertical reaction function. Note that the number of
ﬁrms (N) does not deﬁne the sign of the vertical reaction function but determines how
reactive local governments are to a variation in the federal tax rate. In other words, N
does not modify the complementarity/substitutability condition (that is exactly the same
as the one found in previous models) but deﬁnes the sensitivity of t to a variation in T .
This is the main result of the paper.
A simple numerical application of the linear cost/iso-elastic demand case (based on
the U.S. cigarette market) will help the reader by nicely illustrating the main result of
the model discussed above. The model is calibrated by plugging the values for T , P and
 in order to show how the sensitivity of t to a 1% increase in T varies for diﬀerent values
of N . Prices and tax rates ﬁgures are taken from Orzechowski and Walker (2012).11
Regarding the price elasticity of cigarette demand, an important variance among the
diﬀerent estimates is observed in the literature. The estimates seem to vary considerably
depending, for instance, on the diﬀerent methodologies and samples considered. As one
could expect, the estimates seem to be highly dependent on the target group as well.
Diﬀerent studies focus on particular groups in order to cluster by age, sex, socioeconomic
situation, educational attainment or even particular characteristics such as pregnancy.12
The model is calibrated using the estimates of Ding (2003) and Hana and Chaloupka
(2004) by setting an elasticity of demand equal to 1.4.13
Figure 1 illustrates the reaction functions when dP
dτ
= 1 is imposed (red-dashed line)
and when there is no restriction on the shifting condition (blue-solid line).14 As one can
observe, in both cases dt
dT
> 0. This reﬂects the complementarity condition that holds
under both frameworks. Now, the straight-dashed line indicates that the reaction function
is constant ( dt
dT
= 0.1789) and does not vary with N . On the other hand, the solid line
shows how, in this setting, the sensitivity of t to a variation in T decreases with the
11The annual compendium on tobacco revenue and industry statistics known as The Tax Burden on
Tobacco is produced by the economic consulting ﬁrm Orzechowski and Walker and published by the
Federation of Tax Administrators.
12For a complete review on the estimates of the price elasticity of cigarette demand, see, Surgeon's
General Report (2000).
13This is an arbitrary choice. Nevertheless, as already discussed throughout the paper, the results of
the model are robust and hold for any  > 0.
14Figure 2 shows the results for the linear cost/linear demand case.
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number of ﬁrms in the industry. Indeed, note that the highest value of dt
dT
equals 0.6261
for the monopoly case and it decreases as N increases. In the limit, when N → ∞, it
converges to 0.1789. This makes sense given that under perfect competition dP
dτ
= 1, which
turns out to be the assumption made by previous tax competition studies.
To put it diﬀerently, in this setting, a 10% increase in T would be followed by a reac-
tion of local governments roughly lying between 6.3% and 1.8%, depending on the level
of concentration of the industry. Previous settings, would only consider the lowest bound
(1.8%) which might be particularly misleading given the highest level of concentration
observed in those industries where excise taxes are levied. For instance, the 2002 eco-
nomic census published by the U.S. Department of Commerce shows that the largest four
companies in the cigarette industry accounted for 95.3% of total shipments.15 In such a
concentrated industry, one could expect the vertical reaction function to be very sensible
and, thus, closer to the highest bound. In other words, unlike previous settings, this
model not only allows the federal policy maker to know whether local governments would
increase or decrease their tax rates after a variation of the federal tax rate, but also how
important this reaction would be.
4 Conclusion
This model brings together tax incidence and tax competition, two strands of literature
that in spite of several points in common have only been studied separately. In both
cases the curvature of the demand function is the key parameter determining the main
result of the model. From a tax incidence perspective, taxes are under-, fully, or over-
shifted depending on η, a parameter accounting for the elasticity of the slope of the inverse
demand function. Similarly, the elasticity of the demand function determines the com-
plementarity/substitutability condition in a tax competition framework. Merging these
two frameworks in a comprehensive setting and formalizing the existence correspondence
between their main outputs is a nice contribution to public ﬁnance literature per se.
Nevertheless, the main contribution concerns market structure and its impact on the
vertical reaction function dt
dT
. This model extends a classical vertical tax competition
model by allowing local governments to internalize the possibility that taxes are over-
/undershifted. In order to do this, the assumption that producer prices are constant
is explicitly relaxed. This assumption (standard in previous tax competition settings)
implicitly constrains taxes to be fully-passed to consumers and, thus, rules out the impact
of any tax incidence feature from the tax setting decision.
To put it diﬀerently, by relaxing the assumption that producer prices are constant,
consumer prices are allowed to under/overreact to a variation of tax rates and, hence, tax
incidence features are internalized into the tax setting process. As a consequence, market
structure now plays a key role on the tax setting decision. In particular, it turns out to be
one of the determinants of the vertical reaction function. Interestingly, even if the number
of ﬁrms in the industry does not modify the strategic complementarity/substitutability
condition from previous settings, it determines the sensitivity of local tax rates (t) to a
15www.census.gov/prod/ec02/ec0231sr1.pdf
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variation in higher-level tax rates (T ). This is a crucial piece of information, with potential
relevant policy implications, that was absent in previous tax competition models.
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Appendix. Derivation of the tax incidence condition
Following the standard notation in tax incidence models that has been ﬁrst deﬁned in
Seade (1980), one can rewrite the second-order condition in Equation (4) as follows:
d
(
dP
dq
)
dN
(η +N +Nk) < 0, (A.1)
where η = Q
(
d2P
dq2
dP
dq
)
is the elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand function and
k = 1−
(
d2c
dq2
dP
dq
)
measures the relative slopes of the demand and marginal cost curves.
Note that since dP
dq
< 0, η+N+Nk > 0 is necessary and suﬃcient for the second-order
condition to hold.
Now, using this notation, one can diﬀerentiate Equation (3) to get:
dq
dτ
=
1
dP
dq
(η +N + k)
. (A.2)
Thus,
dQ
dτ
=
N
dP
dq
(η +N + k)
(A.3)
and, therefore,
dP
dτ
=
dP
dq
dQ
dτ
=
N
N + η + k
. (A.4)
The standard tax incidence condition previously shown in Equation (10) is directly derived
from Equation (A.4):
dP
dτ
=
N
N + (η + k)

< 1 ⇒ undershifting
= 1 ⇒ full shifting
> 1 ⇒ overshifting
13
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hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhTax incidence
Tax competition
Strategic substitutes ( dt
dT
< 0) Strategic complemets ( dt
dT
> 0)
Undershifting Not possible
(dP
dτ
< 1)
Overshifting Not possible
(dP
dτ
> 1)
Figure 1: Sensitivity of the vertical reaction function (Iso-elastic demand)
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